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Fiscal Consolidation during a Depression: the current
economic pain could not have been avoided but could have
been substantially reduced
John Van Reenen and Nitika Bagaria respond to the recent bad news on government
borrowing by modelling three different fiscal consolidation scenarios. They argue that all
scenarios point to the economy returning to long-run equilibrium, but note that the policy
prescription to delay deficit reduction until after recovery is clearly under way is the most
valid.    
Based on f igures released by the ONS on Tuesday, the UK government had to borrow
money in July, tradit ionally a good month f or tax receipts. Public sector net borrowing was
£0.6 billion in July 2012 – £3.4 billion higher net borrowing than a year ago. The public
sector current budget surplus had decreased to £1.2 billion in July 2012 f rom a surplus
of  £4.2 billion last year. These f igures come despite the UK announcing f iscal
consolidation measures amounting to a total of  7.4 per cent of  GDP over the f iscal
years 2011–12 to 2016 –17. What went wrong?
At the time of  its announcement, many argued that consolidation should be delayed until
recovery was clearly established. During a prolonged period of  depression when unemployment is well
above its “natural” rate (the NAIRU), short- term interest rates are ef f ectively at zero and output
substantially below capacity the impact of  f iscal t ightening may be much worse than in normal t imes.
Others argued that early action was required to prevent large def icits leading to higher interest rates.
However, f ew on either side attempted to quantif y the costs and benef its of  delay. Our new research
published this month research attempts to do just that.
Why standard macro models got it  wrong
In the standard macro models used by most central banks and f inance ministries, the impacts of  f iscal
policy are small and short- lived. Firstly, with an inf lation target, central banks will largely of f set the impact
on demand of  changes to f iscal policy. Secondly, f iscal multipliers don’t vary much, if  at all, across the
cycle, so it doesn’t matter much when consolidation is undertaken. Thirdly, the strong equilibrium-
reverting properties of  such models means that output tends to revert to trend in any event.
However, these assumptions are all questionable. First, interest rates, both short and long term, are
currently extraordinarily low, despite very high def icits. Under normal circumstances a tightening in f iscal
policy can be expected to be accommodated by a relaxation in monetary policy. However, with interest
rates already at exceptionally low levels, f urther t ightening of  f iscal policy is unlikely to result in such an
of f setting monetary policy reaction.
Second, in normal t imes, the ability to borrow enables households and f irms to smooth consumption and
investment over t ime, reducing the impact of  f iscal policy. But, during a downturn when unemployment is
high and job security low, a greater percentage of  households and f irms are likely to f ind themselves
f inancially constrained. This is likely to be particularly acute when the downturn is driven by an impaired
banking system.
Third, long spells of  depressed output and high unemployment can lead to ‘hysteresis’ which keeps the
productive capacity of  the economy persistently or even permanently lower. Extended periods of
depressed output and high unemployment can have long-term implications f or the productive capacity of
the economy. A host of  mechanisms could be responsible f or these hysteresis ef f ects. These include
reduced capital investment, premature capital scrapping, reduced labour f orce attachment on the part of
the long-term unemployed resulting in lower wage pressures, scarring ef f ects on young workers who
have trouble beginning their careers and changes in managerial att itudes. In particular, the incidence of
long-term unemployment may reduce the downward pressure on wages exerted by a high general
unemployment rate and thus lead to unemployment hysteresis or persistence long af ter the shocks have
dissipated.
The long-term unemployed are less likely to look f or, or to get, jobs, and may suf f er permanent damage
to skills and motivation. This may reduce the ef f iciency of  the labour market, damaging output and
employment; the existence of  these hysteresis ef f ects in the UK labour market are well established, but
rarely incorporated into macroeconomic f orecasting.
Making macro-models meet reality
We use the National Institute’s macro, NiGEM, to model all three of  these ef f ects. We assume that
monetary policy would not in practice have responded to changes in f iscal policy, with interest rates at
the zero lower bound and demand depressed; we assume that a higher proportion than normal of
consumers and f irms are credit constrained; and we incorporate into our wage determination equation
the impact of  current elevated levels of  long-term unemployment.
We contrast three scenarios: (i) the consolidation plan implemented during a depression; (ii) the same
plan, but with implementation delayed f or three years when the economy has recovered; and (iii) no
consolidation at all. The modelling conf irms that doing nothing was not an option and would have led to
unsustainable debt ratios. Under both our “immediate consolidation” scenario and the “delayed
consolidation”, the necessary increases in taxes and reductions in spending reduce growth and increase
unemployment, as expected. But our estimates indicate that the impact would have been substantially
less, and less long- lasting, if  consolidation had been delayed until more normal t imes. The impact is
partly driven by the heightened magnitude of  f iscal multipliers, and exacerbated by the prolongation of
their impact due to hysteresis ef f ects. The cumulative loss of  output over the period 2011-21 amounts
to about £239 billion in 2010 prices, or about 16 per cent of  2010 GDP. And unemployment is
considerably higher f or longer – still 1 percentage point higher even in 2019.
Under current policy plans the unemployment rate is expected to remain above 7 per cent until 2016. Had
tightening measures been delayed until economic recovery was well underway, cumulative output on the
period 2011–21 would have been signif icantly higher, and the unemployment rate would have been
expected to rise no higher than 7 per cent over the next decade.
It is important to say that these are scenarios, not f orecasts; our modelling could be overestimating or
indeed underestimating the impact of  delay. The choice of  2014 as a time when the economy would have
returned to normal is arbitrary, and of  course in reality wider global economic developments could well
have changed that in any case. But they are a usef ul illustration of  why, and how much, macroeconomic
policy judgements matter.
Conclusions
The concern today is that the Great Recession starting in 2008 and the consequent early f iscal
t ightening policies may lead to signif icant losses in output and a protracted period of  high
unemployment. The recent public f inances data release and the analysis presented in this note indicate
that these concerns are well- f ounded. The good news is that, in the long run, in our model at least, it
does all wash out; whatever the path of  consolidation, the economy eventually returns to long-run
equilibrium. What this analysis shows is that the economic pain resulting f rom f iscal consolidation could
not have been avoided, but could have been substantially reduced. The standard policy prescription – to
delay def icit reduction until af ter recovery is clearly under way and the output shortf all signif icantly
reduced – remains valid.
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